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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

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Agree Foreign Secretary's  
recommended course of action  
at (iii)?

27 August 1981

Dear Willie,

S. J. Pike  
Duty Clerk  
27.8.81

Yes  
mt

Ottawa Summit Statement on Terrorism

attached  
Flay B

Flay A

- In the Ottawa Summit statement on terrorism and hijacking, the Seven agreed to suspend air services with Afghanistan unless Afghanistan immediately took steps to comply with its international obligations by prosecuting or handing over to Pakistan those involved in the hijacking of a PIA aircraft in March. President Mitterrand, in agreeing to the statement, appeared to have overruled earlier French arguments that they could not suspend air services immediately because of the terms of their Air Services Agreement (ASA) with Afghanistan. But despite lobbying by other members of the Seven, the French, with President Mitterrand's explicit endorsement, have reverted to their former position (see Paris telegram number 706, copy attached). Only the Germans, the French and ourselves have air links with Afghanistan; if the French now refuse to act there is a risk that the Germans, who also have an Air Services Agreement, will follow suit. Meanwhile Pakistan has anticipated action by the Seven by warning Afghanistan that Pakistan will sever air services on 1 September unless Afghanistan complies with its international obligations. Pakistan had hoped to co-ordinate this action with the Seven. It is too late for that but failure now to support Pakistan would have obvious implications, both for the West's general relations with Pakistan and for our attempts to maintain effective pressure over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The value of the Ottawa Summit will be seriously weakened if the Seven cannot act together; and the Bonn Declaration itself will be seen to be toothless, if ASAs are judged to take precedence over it. President Mitterrand's decision therefore places us in an awkward position. There are three courses we can pursue.

- (i) try to persuade President Mitterrand to drop French objections to taking immediate action. Ideally, this should be done by Mr Trudeau, as Chairman of the Summit, but Canadian officials judge that for bilateral political reasons the Canadian Government may not wish to put too much pressure on the French President. The problem does not justify an attempt to concert an approach by all the remaining members

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of the Seven to President Mitterrand: and Lord Carrington would not recommend raising the matter bilaterally with the Anglo/French Summit less than three weeks away. Moreover, it is our judgement that President Mitterrand is unlikely to be shaken from his present position, even by an approach at Head of Government level;

- (ii) take no action against Afghanistan. It has always been accepted that the Seven should try to act together, or not at all. In this case, however, the commitment to action was so clear that a decision not to impose sanctions on Afghanistan would be seen as an admission that the Seven are unable to act together against terrorism. This would be welcome news for the Babrak Kamal regime, and might encourage other governments, which had previously been deterred by the sanctions threatened by the Bonn Declaration, to harbour terrorists. In addition, Pakistan would justifiably feel let down with the implications mentioned above.
- (iii) persuade the rest of the Seven that the Seven should still deliver an ultimatum to Afghanistan, despite French foot-dragging. This is not an ideal course, but it should enable the Seven to salvage something from the Ottawa Statement.

Lord Carrington recommends that we adopt the third course. He proposes that we should seek the agreement of the rest of the Seven to this course, paying particular attention to the Germans. Ideally we would like the rest of the Seven to give notice to the Afghans on 1 September, to coincide with the cessation of air services by Pakistan. This means that we need to clear our lines with our partners this week. The French would of course be informed of what was proposed and encouraged to join in if they could, but it would be made clear to them that they had no veto. I should therefore be grateful to know as soon as possible whether the Prime Minister or Mr Biffen have any objections to the course of action outlined above. If the Germans will not support us, we should risk being in the invidious position of being alone with Pakistan in cutting air links with Afghanistan. In that event, Lord Carrington would wish to consider further what action we should take.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Trade and the Home Secretary.

Willie Rickett Esq  
10 Downing Street

Yours very truly,  
*Francis Richards*  
(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

MRT 021/6

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21 AUG 1981

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 706 OF 20 AUGUST 1981

INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA WASHINGTON ROME BONN TOKYO KABUL ISLAMABAD

YOUR TELNO 343: OTTAWA SUMMIT DECLARATION ON TERRORISM

1. THE ECONOMIC (AND ACTING POLITICAL) ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE, SAUTTER, TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD DECIDED THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF AN ABRUPT CESSATION OF FRENCH AIR SERVICES TO AFGHANISTAN (SAUTTER DESCRIBED THIS AS CONFIRMATION OF THE LINE TAKEN AT LUNCH ON 20 JULY BY M CHEYSSON). PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WAS STILL CONSIDERING WHETHER THE FRANCO-AFGHAN AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT SHOULD BE DENOUNCED - IE SO THAT FLIGHTS WOULD TERMINATE 12 MONTHS LATER. BUT EVEN THIS WOULD PRESENT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES.

2. THE CANADIAN EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY THAT THEY HAD NEITHER SOUGHT NOR RECEIVED ANY REPLY FROM THE FRENCH TO THEIR DEMARCHE AND THAT THEY HAD HAD NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM OTTAWA.

3. PARAGRAPH 1. ABOVE APPEARS TO REFLECT A RETURN TO THE FRENCH LINE OF EXPRESSING DOUBTS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF IMPOSING SANCTIONS UNDER THE BONN DECLARATION. CURRENT FRENCH PRE-OCCUPATION WITH THE PROBLEM OF GRANTING POLITICAL ASYLUM TO THE IRANIAN EXILES WHO HIJACKED AN IRANIAN NAVAL VESSEL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN HAS NO DOUBT AFFECTED THEIR ATTITUDE EVEN THOUGH THE CASES ARE DIFFERENT. A CLOSER PARALLEL IS THE HIJACKING BY BANI SADR OF THE IRANIAN AEROPLANE TO GET HIM BACK TO FRANCE WHERE HE HAS BEEN GIVEN POLITICAL ASYLUM. BUT THE FRENCH THEMSELVES HAVE VOLUNTEERED NO INDICATION THAT MOTIVES OF THIS SORT LIE BEHIND THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE BONN DECLARATION ALTHOUGH I GAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO TO THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI WHEN I SAW HIM ON TUESDAY.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

PETRIE

STANDARD  
MAED  
WED  
SAD

COPIES TO  
MR FORTNAM. CAIR | DOT

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OTTAWA SUMMIT STATEMENT ON TERRORISM

1. The Heads of State and Government, seriously concerned about the active support given to international terrorism through the supply of money and arms to terrorist groups, and about the sanctuary and training offered terrorists, as well as the continuation of acts of violence and terrorism such as aircraft hijacking, hostage-taking and attacks against diplomatic and consular personnel and premises, reaffirm their determination vigorously to combat such flagrant violations of international law. Emphasizing that all countries are threatened by acts of terrorism in disregard of fundamental human rights, they resolve to strengthen and broaden action within the international community to prevent and punish such acts.

2. The Heads of State and Government view with particular concern the recent hijacking incidents which threaten the safety of international civil aviation. They recall and reaffirm the principles set forth in the 1978 Bonn Declaration and note that there are several hijackings which have not been resolved by certain states in conformity with their obligations under international law. They call upon the governments concerned to discharge their obligations promptly and thereby contribute to the safety of international civil aviation.

3. The Heads of State and Government are convinced that, in the case of the hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft in March, the conduct of the Babrak Karmal government of Afghanistan, both during the incident and subsequently in giving refuge to the hijackers, was and is in flagrant breach of its international obligations under the Hague Convention to which Afghanistan is a party, and constitutes a serious threat to air safety. Consequently the Heads of State and Government propose to suspend all flights to and from Afghanistan in implementation of the Bonn Declaration unless Afghanistan immediately takes steps to comply with its obligations. Furthermore, they call upon all states which share their concern for air safety to take appropriate action to persuade Afghanistan to honour its obligations.

4. Recalling the Venice Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages, the Heads of State and Government approve continued cooperation in the event of attacks on diplomatic and consular establishments or personnel of any of their governments. They undertake that in the event of such incidents, their governments will immediately consult on an appropriate response. Moreover, they resolve that any state which directly aids and abets the commission of terrorist acts condemned in the Venice Statement, should face a prompt international response. It was agreed to exchange information on terrorist threats and activities, and to explore cooperative measures for dealing with and countering acts of terrorism, for promoting more effective implementation of existing anti-terrorist conventions, and for securing wider adherence to them.