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27 March 1982

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, BRUSSELS

29/30 MARCH 1982

POLITICAL COOPERATION

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Briefs on Political Cooperation subjects are attached as follows:

- A. Afghanistan
- B. Transatlantic relations: machinery for consultation
- C. Middle East
- D. Central America
- E. Turkey
- F. Cyprus
- G. CSCE
- H. Vietnamese Refugees

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AFGHANISTAN

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Afghanistan not forgotten, despite overriding interest in Poland. But there is a continuing information task. Afghanistan Day helped, and Pakistan again took the lead at UN Commission on Human Rights.
2. Must maintain international concern, particularly among Islamic and Third World countries. The refugees (now 2.6 million in Pakistan alone) may become increasingly a subject of concern.
3. West must also keep up political pressure in bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union, and should link Afghanistan with Poland in public statements. Ten should reaffirm that proposals of 30 June 1981 offer a reasonable and workable way forward, if Russians sincerely desire a political solution.
4. UN Secretary-General's appointment of Cordovez as representative on Afghanistan should also focus attention on situation. We should emphasise in public statements that UN mediation must be in accordance with the principles of the UNGA resolutions.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Afghanistan Day

1. Prime Minister sent a message to the Afghanistan Support Committee, and received a delegation from the Committee, including four Afghans. HMG brought over four Afghans for publicity.

Refugees

2. British aid since January 1980 totals some £8.7 million including a recent donation of £750,000 of food aid. Scheme

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announced on 16 March provides 20 scholarships per year for Afghans to continue tertiary education in UK.

3. Since the UNGA resolution in November 1981 we have been discussing with the Pakistanis the idea that Pakistan should ask the UN Secretary-General and UN High Commissioner for Refugees to call a conference on refugees. This would be primarily humanitarian, but would have a political spin-off in attracting international attention. Although Pakistan showed some interest in the autumn, it now seems unlikely that they will wish to take an initiative of this sort at present.

Ten's Proposals

4. The Russians maintain that the Karmal regime must be involved in any conference from the outset, and that Soviet withdrawal cannot be the subject of negotiation. In the face of this intransigence, there would be no advantage in suggesting any modification to the proposals.

UN Secretary-General's Personal Representative

5. Diego Cordovez was appointed on 22 February. Not for Use: He appears to wish to distance his mediation from the UNGA resolutions, and to try to set up a meeting between the Karmal regime and Pakistan. This would give some legitimacy to the regime, but would not bring Soviet withdrawal any closer.

Situation in Afghanistan

6. Soviet troop levels have increased by some 5,000 to a total of 90-95,000 in December/January. The Russians appear to have adopted more aggressive tactics causing significant resistance casualties. The resistance nevertheless continue a high level of activity in nearly every province, and continue to mount successful attacks on Soviet convoys.

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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS : MACHINERY FOR CONSULTATION

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Share others' concern about transatlantic relations, but they are not as bad as they are sometimes painted.
2. Priority is to make existing machinery work. The ten Political Directors are examining this in the Ten. In the Alliance, June Summit must be a success.
3. [If Necessary] Of proposals currently put forward, most attracted by Genscher's idea of informal meetings of NATO Ministers. However, there are constraints on ministerial time, and perhaps one meeting a year might be more practical than two. The possibility of a second meeting might be kept in reserve for difficult periods.

BACKGROUND

Reference: A : Presidency Draft Statement for Final Communiqué

4. There have been a number of difficulties in transatlantic relations in recent months, in foreign policy (Poland, USSR, Middle East, Central America), economic questions (interest rates, steel, agricultural prices), and in the field of security (INF, US concern at peace movements in Europe). These difficulties, however, arise more often from a difference of interests (eg over the gas pipeline) or points of view than because the machinery for consultation is inadequate.
5. It is also important to retain perspective: transatlantic relations have gone through even more difficult periods in the past (eg. 1973). There have also been many useful recent bilateral contacts - Genscher and Mitterrand have recently visited

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Washington, and President Reagan's speech on the zero option in November 1981, which was well received in Europe, is a recent example of transatlantic communication working well.

6. We would nevertheless not oppose measures to improve transatlantic communication, provided these did not add unduly to the burden on ministers' time or create new machinery. There have been two recent proposals for improvements in the machinery of consultation:

- a. Sr Colombo, in a speech at Georgetown University on 18 February, proposed a Euro-American Friendship Act, which would be a reaffirmation of the political will of Europe and the US to act together for peace, security and liberty; would cover the political aspects of East-West relations, action to help the Third World and coordination of economic policies; and would provide for periodic meetings between Foreign Ministers of the Ten and the US Secretary of State to coordinate their views, especially in times of crisis.
- b. Herr Genscher, during a visit to Washington at the beginning of March, proposed that NATO Foreign Ministers should meet twice a year informally, without advisers, to discuss current issues.

7. The Americans have expressed interest in the ideas, but have not commented on them in detail. Of the two, Genscher's idea of informal meetings of NATO Foreign Ministers is better, since it does not involve new machinery. We are not, however, convinced that further meetings are indispensable.

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Statement on Relations with the United States

8. The draft Presidency conclusions will contain a short paragraph (first draft annexed) welcoming President Reagan's message of greetings to the Community on its 25th Anniversary and saying that the Ten are resolved to develop their links with the United States and to reinforce transatlantic consultations.

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DRAFT STATEMENT CIRCULATED BY PRESIDENCY : 27 MARCH 1982

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

1. On the day following the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the European Council examined the state of transatlantic relations.
2. It welcomed the statement by the President of the United States which indicated in particular on the occasion of this anniversary that Washington considered 'a strong and united Europe not as a rival but as a partner' and that 'the United States looks today towards Europe to cooperate in a spirit of full association in accordance with political and economic importance'.
3. In this context it stressed the wish of the Ten to reinforce their ties with the United States to develop further transatlantic consultations.

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MIDDLE EAST

POINTS TO MAKE

Arab/Israel

1. Europe must remain active on basis of Venice principles. We should urge Arabs including the PLO to work towards a positive strategy for peace if Americans are to be brought to more balanced policy. Also important to dispel Israeli distrust of European role (Lord Carrington's visit to Israel). President Mitterrand's views on future role for Europe?
2. Not the right time for further European Council Declaration except on the specific points of the West Bank and the Sinai MFO. Venice Declaration carefully worked out and balanced: mistake to try and rewrite it. This would invite comparison, causing confusion and trouble. A European Council statement might be useful later in the year but careful preparation necessary.

Unrest on the West Bank

3. Grave concern. Particularly worried by disproportionate violence used by Israelis against demonstrators. Agree need firm statement. [If Raised] Lord Carrington's visit still on. Important at this time to keep open communications with Israel, and make clear our views.

Iran/Iraq

4. West must sustain position of neutrality. No role for Ten to play at mediation. Could only alienate Iran further and confuse existing efforts at mediation.

Libya

5. Important that Ten should examine implications for Ten of US

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measures. Americans have asked us not to undermine their
action and have focussed on 'dual use' items. Despite useful
exclusions we could face problems in future.

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Background

References:

- A : Draft Statement on the Middle East prepared by Political Directors, 26 March 1982
- B : UK Statement on the West Bank (25 March 1982)

Arab-Israel

1. Further progress in peace efforts must await completion of the Sinai withdrawal. The Ten continue to have an interest in helping to create the conditions for a transition to a wider negotiation after that. Although prospects do not look bright at present, the Ten need to remain active, particularly in promoting the mutual acceptance of rights by the Israelis and the Palestinians (which means in practice the PLO) that lies at the heart of Venice.
2. President Mitterrand in his address to the Knesset repeated his reservations about the Venice Declaration, but carefully marked out an individual role for France on Middle East questions. On the substance of the Palestinian issue he stuck close to the Venice principles, except:-
 - (i) he took a step forward from Venice by making a qualified reference to a Palestinian 'state'; and,
 - (ii) a step back by describing the PLO as 'speaking on behalf of the fighters' and calling for it to accept Israel's rights, without calling for its association with negotiations.

The French were pressed at the Political Directors' meeting on 15-16 March to say what their view of the Ten's role now was.

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They suggested that it should be limited to encouraging the parties especially the Palestinians and including the PLO, to talk to each other. President Mitterrand implicitly excluded a plan for a comprehensive settlement to be proposed by the Europeans.

3. Further European Council Declaration on the Middle East

Political Directors met on 26 March and agreed on a provisional basis a draft statement on the Middle East. The sections on the Sinai MFO and the West Bank are satisfactory but the other paragraphs, in particular paragraph 2, are unnecessary and are likely to do more harm than good. The second paragraph repeats phrases from the Venice Declaration which will not please the Israelis; nor will it please the Arabs since (unlike Venice) it fails to mention the PLO. The question of further European statements on the Middle East was discussed at a meeting held by the Secretary of State on 26 March. It was agreed that it would be better to avoid general statements which rewrite Venice for the time being and to work for a properly prepared statement, possibly at the June European Council. This could leave the main principles of the Venice Declaration untouched, but would develop the ideas in the last paragraph of the Venice Declaration which referred to the possibility of a European initiative.

West Bank

4. A total of seven Arabs and one Israeli soldier have been killed to date (27 March) in disturbances triggered off by the banning by the Israeli military authorities of the Mayor and Municipal Council of the town of El-Bireh. On 25 March the Israelis dismissed the Mayors of the West Bank towns of Nablus

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and Ramallah. All three Mayors were democratically elected in April 1976. A general strike in the five main West Bank towns has been extended indefinitely. There have been reports that at least one Palestinian was killed by Israeli settlers.

5. The FCO spokesman issued a statement on 25 March; (text attached). The Ten Foreign Ministers discussed the situation on 23 March, and M. Tindemans spoke to the press to express the Ministers' growing concern.

Libya

6. US Government announced on 10 March a ban on imports of Libyan crude oil into the United States and restrictions on exports of American products and technology to Libya. All US exports except some agricultural and medical goods will require a licence. Policy will be to deny licences for oil and gas technology and machinery (unless readily available from non-US sources) and 'dual use' items such as computers. Measures come at a bad time for Qadhafi who has financial problems with falling oil revenues.

7. We were given advance warning and told of exclusions which should help to avoid problems of extra territorial application of US law of the kind we have experienced over Aviation Traders Ltd. Americans have asked us not to undercut their policies.

8. Ten share our view that policy of cautious dialogue with Libya more likely to influence Qadhafi than US policy of isolation. All have trading links. Italy and France and Germany import Libyan oil. We have encouraged partners to discuss implications of US policies. Middle East Working Group producing a paper on Libya (some resistance from the French on need to keep in touch with Americans).

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9. We believe Americans have considered Sixth Fleet exercise off Libya of the kind which led to the clash in the Gulf of Sirte in August 1981. Qadhafi has warned that US incursion would be strongly resisted. We also reject Libyan claim that all Gulf is territorial waters, but provocative manoeuvres unlikely to achieve much.

10. Qadhafi clearly attaches great importance to OAU Summit (28 July - 8 August). Row in Addis Ababa over SADR seating must cast doubts on viability of Summit.

Iran/Iraq

11. The War Iran mounted a major offensive on 22 March in the area west of Shush. The final result of what may be the biggest battle since hostilities began in September 1980 is still not known. Despite exaggerated claims by both belligerents, Iraq may have come out worst. It is too early to predict what overall effect the battle may have on the outcome of the War.

12. Mediation This latest offensive may only further stiffen Iranian resolve to continue the conflict. On their last rounds of visits to the area, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr Olaf Palme, and the Islamic Conference Good Office Committee, led by Sekou Toure, found neither side in mood to compromise on conditions for ceasefire and negotiated settlement. However, in public the Iraqis appear prepared to fudge the issues. This may reflect their readiness to negotiate under conditions short of capitulation. During M. Cheysson's visit to Baghdad on 21 February, the Iraqis asked him why the Europeans were not making greater efforts to end the War.

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We do not know what M. Cheysson said in reply. French proposals at Working Group level that the Ten should issue a declaration appear to have been dropped.

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DRAFT STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST PREPARED BY POLITICAL COMMITTEE,
26 MARCH 1982

(UK Translation)

MIDDLE EAST

1. The European Council examined the development of the situation in the Middle East.
2. It reaffirmed its wish to contribute to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, based on the right to existence and security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, in particular its right to self-determination.
3. In this context it noted [with satisfaction] the participation of four Member countries of the European Community in the multi-national force and observers in the Sinai, with a view to the completion on 25 April of the withdrawal from Sinai by Israel.
4. Seriously concerned by the grave events which are taking place in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, which add to the measures taken by Israel with regard to the Golan Heights, the European Council urges that an end be brought to the dangerous chain of violence and repression. It condemns the dismissal by the Israeli authorities of the democratically elected Mayors as well as the impairment of the rights and liberties of the inhabitants of those territories. In effect such unilateral measures can only damage the prospects for peace.
5. Concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the region including the Lebanon, the European Council calls on

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all the interested parties to renounce violence and to work on the basis of the principles recognised by the international community for a solution which guarantees security for all the states in the region and justice for all the peoples.

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WEST BANK

Statement by FCO Spokesman on 25 March:

'We view developments on the West Bank with grave concern. We deplore the dismissal by the Israeli military authorities of the democratically elected Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah, as well as the earlier dismissal of the Mayor of El-Bireh. We appeal again for an end to the violence, which can only harm the prospects of a settlement.'

CENTRAL AMERICA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Central America is of prime importance to the Americans, much less so to Europe. We must minimise transatlantic splits.
2. President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative is a welcome attempt to deal with the economic problems of the area. US and European efforts should be complementary.

El Salvador

3. Urgent need for a political solution. Elections on 28 March are a step in the right direction but will not solve the problem.
4. UK decision to send election observers essentially neutral. We need to know more about the situation. Report will be made public.
5. After the elections further steps towards a political solution will be needed. Must await final outcome. But would hope with broader base of support Duarte might take firmer grip on military extremists, encourage moderates on left to abandon support for guerrilla alliance. Aim must be end to bloodshed, encourage political consolidation.

Mexican Initiative

6. We would not rule out Mexican proposal for negotiations. It is imaginative. Deserves to be taken seriously. Those approached (US, Cuba and Nicaragua) have not rejected it.
7. We should encourage their participation but we should not overlook potential difficulties.

EC initiative (if raised)

8. This is not the moment to consider an EC initiative. This could complicate the issue and prejudice the success of the Mexican initiative. Besides EC influence limited. Best way ahead is to feed our views into the US who will remain the major actor.

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9. Foreign Ministers should be instructed to discuss the issue depth at a later date.

Nicaragua

10. Deplore continuing leftward trend and military build-up. Target strength of army (50,000) and integrated volunteer militia (200,000) out of all proportion to threat to Nicaragua. Declaration of state of emergency seems to be attempt to attract international attention and sympathy. May help Sandinistas to strengthen their hold.

EC aid to Central America (Defensive)

11. We should assure Central American democracies (Belize, Costa Rica, Honduras) of our support. But it would be counter-productive to arouse expectations of increased EC assistance when we are not intending to make more money available.

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BACKGROUND

References:

- A : Draft European Council Statement
- B : European Aid to Central America

Caribbean Basin Initiative

1. President Reagan's plan for the economic development of the region encourages trade and private investment and offers improved access to the US market for Central American and Caribbean exports. This approach is being coordinated with Venezuela, Mexico and Canada. The plan has been generally welcomed in the area (but not by Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada who will be excluded).

El Salvador

2. Military situation is unclear. The guerrillas have made impressive gains and are again increasing pressure. But we doubt whether they could sustain a more widespread offensive, especially against a better-trained and equipped Salvadorean army. US military assistance will be \$81 million this year.

Salvadorean Elections

3. Professor Derek Bowett and Sir John Galsworthy are in El Salvador to observe the elections on 28 March. Only three parties are expected to achieve any measure of support:-

- (i) Christian Democrats - PDC (moderate centre, the party of President Duarte);
- (ii) National Conciliation Party - PCN (right); and,
- (iii) National Republican Alliance - ARENA (extreme right).

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The PDC favours continued economic and social reform, firmer control of the armed forces and (although not admitted publicly), post-electoral talks with elements of the left-wing opposition FDR (mostly in exile). ARENA wants a ruthless anti-guerrilla campaign (preceded by an amnesty) and an end to the Duarte reforms. PCN accepts the reforms so far implemented but wants no more.

4. The size of the electorate is unknown but is estimated at one and a quarter million: likely participation is 30 - 50%. Less than 400,000 will be seen as a victory for the FDR. The 70 seat Constituent Assembly will appoint a new President and Cabinet.

Mexican Initiative

5. Mexican President López Portillo has consistently supported a solution through negotiations before elections. A commitment to this was contained in the Franco/Mexican Declaration on El Salvador last August. The latest Mexican proposals are based on reaching agreement between the Salvadorean Government and the Opposition on the terms for setting up a Constituent Assembly to establish conditions for elections. They also include:-

- (a) a dialogue between Cuba and the US;
- (b) a statement by the US ruling out the use of force against Nicaragua;
- (c) reduction or disbandment of groups of Nicaraguan exiles undergoing military training (in Honduras and the US) in exchange for a reduction of the Nicaraguan military build-up.

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6. Mexican Foreign Minister Castaneda met Secretary Haig on 6 and 14 March. There was some discussion of the Mexican proposals and the Americans are now taking a more favourable view of them in public. But the US still insists that its concerns must be met on Nicaraguan involvement in support of the guerrillas. The Mexican approach is set in the context of a conciliatory attitude towards US/Cuba and US/Nicaragua relations but the Americans say that neither Cuba nor Nicaragua is ready to respond to a conciliatory approach. Mexico is angling for EC support, but if her proposals are to succeed they must first receive US backing.

7. The US say they stand by the proposals put to the Nicaraguans by Assistant Secretary of State, Enders, in Managua in August 1981 that:-

(a) The United States should curb the activities in the United States of Nicaraguan exiles opposing the Sandinista Government, and renew economic assistance, providing,

(b) Nicaragua would agree not to import heavy offensive weapons, reduce the number of foreign military and security advisers on its territory and agree to stop supporting the guerrillas in El Salvador.

8. While Secretary Haig has acknowledged Mexico's initiative, he has emphasised that the US must deal bilaterally with the Cubans and Nicaraguans.

9. Sr Castaneda went to Havana and Managua returning on 22 March. He said later the Nicaraguans were well disposed to negotiations. A communiqué issued in Havana stated President Castro regarded the Mexican initiative as 'on the right road'.

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10. There is speculation that a meeting may take place between the US and Nicaragua (possibly in Mexico) soon after the elections in El Salvador (28 March) though the US Government have yet to confirm this. The Mexicans believe the US may also be making direct contact with the Cubans. By maintaining a dialogue with the Mexicans, the US Government have shown that they wish to keep the option of a negotiated settlement in El Salvador. They have also implicitly accepted the Mexican premise that a regional approach, which includes Cuba and Nicaragua, may be the right path.

Nicaragua

11. Nicaraguan leaders have expressed commitment to Marxism-Leninism. The nine-man Sandinista Directorate effectively runs the country. They are turning Nicaragua into a one-party State. Opposition is barely tolerated; the opposition newspaper is regularly banned for days at a time; leaders of the main private sector organisation were arrested in October but have recently been released. A state of emergency has been declared on the grounds that the country is under threat from ex-Somoza supporters training in Honduras and the US. It gives the Directorate wide powers.

12. The threat of US invasion has already been used by Nicaragua to justify deliveries of Soviet tanks; the training of Nicaraguan pilots in Eastern Europe on MiG fighter aircraft and moves to increase the armed forces and militia. We believe that they exaggerate this threat. The US have denied reports of a US\$19 million CIA fund to destabilise Nicaragua. The US portrays Nicaragua as a haven for spreading subversion in Central America, but the evidence produced publicly has not been convincing.

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13. At Nicaraguan request the UN Security Council met on 25 March. The Nicaraguan Representative accused the US of intervening in Nicaraguan affairs. The US Representative rejected Nicaraguan charges and accused Nicaragua itself of totalitarianism and interference in the affairs of its neighbours. The Council will resume discussion on 29 March. No resolution has yet been tabled.

14. The French have decided to sell \$11 million worth of 'defensive' weapons to Nicaragua. They have justified this on the grounds of attempting to reduce Nicaragua's dependence on the Soviet Union for arms supplies.

EC/Central America

15. In September 1981 the French launched a proposal that the EC should take some 'initiative' intensifying relations with Central America. Discussion has proceeded disjointedly. A Commission paper has been prepared advising modest proposals on technical aspects and a general recommendation to increase financial contributions. We could not support a substantial increase and would not want to build up false hopes.

16. The Political Directors met in Brussels on 26 March. France and Germany proposed separate, but similar texts of a resolution to be adopted by the European Council on Central America. A confused discussion followed in which the texts were amalgamated to form the version annexed. The first three paragraphs were generally accepted but agreement could not be reached on the last four (contained in square brackets).

17. In as much as the statement does not commit the EC to any political initiative in Central America we can accept it. It may serve the purpose of enabling countries such as France,

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the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark to let off steam. But we must emphatically maintain the position we adopted at the Political Directors meeting that we cannot agree to an increase in EC aid or for its distribution on a non-discriminatory basis. We and others think it more practical to proceed on a country-by-country approach.

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DRAFT EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT

CENTRAL AMERICA

1. The European Council examined the situation in Central America. The continuing increase in tension in that region is a cause of serious concern. It welcomes with interest all initiatives designed to put an end to the violence and to lead through dialogue and respect for democratic rules and human rights, to the restoration of peace in the region, while safeguarding national sovereignty and the wishes of peoples there.
2. Noting that the tension and conflicts which are endemic in the region, are often rooted in the serious economic problems and social inequalities which the world situation makes worse, to the detriment of the poorest, the European Council considers that the international community cannot remain indifferent to these wrongs.
3. It welcomes the efforts currently deployed in that direction and in particular the initiative of countries of the Nassau group ie the United States, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia.
4. The Community and its member states also have in the past given substantial assistance to the region.
5. The European Council agrees however that the aid given by member states of the EC for the development in Central America and the Caribbean should be co-ordinated and [increased/continued].
6. At the same time, the European Council is in favour of [increasing/maintaining] Community Aid to the region.
7. The European Council instructs the Foreign Ministers to define the modalities according to which this aid should be distributed.

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EUROPEAN AID TO CENTRAL AMERICA

I. COMMUNITY AID, CALENDAR YEAR 1981

In ecu

	Food Aid	Project Aid*	Emergency Aid	Emergency Food Aid
HONDURAS	4.1m	2.8 million (8m in 1980)	1.05 million for El Salvadorean refugees in both countries	0
EL SALVADOR	2.1m	0		0.4 million
GUATEMALA	0	0	0	0
PANAMA	0	0	0	0
COSTA RICA	0	0	0	0
NICARAGUA	8.1m	7.85 million (3m in 1980)	0	0
TOTALS	14.3m	9.8m (11m in 1980)	1.05m	0.4m
GRAND TOTAL	26.40 mecu	(UK share is 20%)		

ecu = £0.56

* Project Aid varies substantially from year to year, because each year one country is selected for special emphasis (Nicaragua in 1981, Honduras in 1980).

II. UK AID (financial year 1981-82)

Honduras	£212,000
El Salvador	£ 23,000
Guatemala	£ 12,000 (+ £716,000 for Mexico)
Panama	£ 67,000
Costa Rica	£380,000
Nicaragua	£ 25,000
Regional Projects	£234,000
TOTAL	£953,000 (£1,669,000 including Mexico)

III. OTHER MEMBER STATES

(figures only available for 1980, not broken down between recipients).

France	US \$2.1 million
FRG	US \$36.1 million
Netherlands	US \$25.9 million

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OBJECTIVE

1. Try to persuade Ten to take realistic view of situation in Turkey and be guided by Tindemans' report in handling Turkish affairs in Ten, Community and Council of Europe.
2. To support a balanced statement which contains some encouragement to Turks eg that Ten will do everything in their power to encourage and support efforts of Turkish authorities to return country to democracy, and eliminate abuses of human rights in accordance with General Evren's stated objectives (Presidency proposing a text).

POINTS TO MAKE

3. Mr Tindemans' visit to Turkey on behalf of Ten a valuable exercise to reiterate our concerns and seek reassurances.
4. Welcome thoroughness both of his talks and of his report. Community's policies towards Turkey should now be based on its findings.
5. Certain recent developments in Turkey unfortunate, but even more convinced now by Mr Tindemans' report that Generals moving overall in right direction. Unrealistic to rush them. Important Turks establish viable democracy which will ensure future stability.
6. Pillorying Turks counter-productive. Of course concerned about human rights. But eg taking Turkey to European Human Rights Commission will probably force her to leave Council of Europe. She needs to be guided back into democratic fold, not isolated from it.

BACKGROUND

Reference A: Summary of Tindeman' report on his visit to Ankara.

1. Faced with rising political violence and prolonged parliamentary deadlock, Generals took power in bloodless coup in September 1980. Pledged to eradicate political violence and restore democracy.

/Killings

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Killings since reduced from over 20 to less than 1 a day.

Consultative Assembly appointed October 1981 to draft new constitution with new parties and electoral laws. Referendum on constitution scheduled by end November 1982 and Parliamentary elections in Autumn 1983 or Spring 1984.

2. But adverse recent measures include: abolition of political parties last Autumn; imprisonment of former Prime Minister Ecevit (for two months) for defying ban on political statements; mass trials, particularly of leaders of DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trades Unions); and, most recently, arrest of some 40 members of Peace Association and reported investigation of 132 former Republican People's Party deputies, including Ecevit.

3. Also torture and mistreatment of prisoners among the some 30,000 arrested since coup in connection with terrorism. Turkish authorities point out that, unlike previous governments in Turkey, they have investigated allegations, punishing culprits; but recently admitted that 15 people had died in custody after torture. Following strongly worded resolution in Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in January, Danes, Dutch, other Scandinavians and French considering taking Turkey to European Commission on Human Rights.

4. Concern amongst Ten has resulted in delays in EC aid. Danes, Dutch, Greeks, Irish and French all critical, but FRG also under strong domestic pressure. Compromise decision at Ministerial PoCo meeting on 23 February that Mr Tindemans should visit Ankara to express Ten's concern over alleged human rights violations and lack of progress towards democracy. Mr Tindemans in Ankara 18-19 March: favourably impressed by firm will of Turkish authorities to return country to democracy as soon as possible and with positive moves being made in this direction. Gave oral report to Foreign Ministers on 23 March. But clear from this meeting and Political Committee of 26 March some of our partners not prepared to accept

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/M. Tindemans'

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Mr Tindemans' findings in light of their own prejudices.

Mr Tindemans has circulated written report (Summary translation at Appendix A).

5. Presidency have noted that since Mr Tindemans' visit President of Constitutional Committee (of Consultative Assembly) has announced rapid progress having been made on draft constitution and that it should be possible to hold referendum this year. Presidency interpret this as an important gesture towards European opinion following Mr Tindemans' visit.

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PRESIDENCY REPORT ON MR TINDEMANS' VISIT TO TURKEY ON BEHALF OF THE TEN (18 - 19 MARCH 1982)

SUMMARY

CONTACTS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

Return to Democracy

1. The Turkish Government confirmed 'without any reserve and forcefully, the will of the Turkish authorities to return as soon as possible to a pluralist democratic system.'

Intervention of Generals

2. The Turkish authorities said that the Generals had reluctantly intervened to save the country from anarchy at a time when democracy had ceased to exist. The population was being terrorised by political violence, claiming an average of 22 lives a day, and Parliament was powerless, having been unable to pass any legislation for 18 months.

Proposed Constitution

3. According to the Turkish authorities the proposed constitution would allow a return to a perfectly normal Western-style parliamentary democracy, with the Head of State having only certain essential powers.

Timetable for Return to Democracy

4. A referendum would take place in April 1983 at the latest and possibly in October/November 1982. Elections by direct universal suffrage would take place in April 1984 at the latest, but probably in October/November 1983. General Evren was urging speed but constitutional advisers were insisting on the later dates.

/Trade Union Rights

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Trade Union Rights

5. Regarding the trials of Turkish trade union leaders, the Turkish authorities said that the accused had been charged with offences under the law as it stood before the military takeover in September 1980. Trade union activity was continuing although there were restrictions (eg. no right to strike or collective bargaining), some of which had been imposed before the Generals came to power. New legislation, giving unions the same rights as in Western Europe, would soon be introduced.

Judiciary

6. The Turkish authorities said that there had been no changes since the coup to existing laws or judicial institutions. It was usual in Turkey for trials to be long and for the public prosecutor to demand stiff penalties.

Torture

7. The Turkish authorities did not seek to deny that torture had occurred. 'They declared forcefully that the Turkish Government abhorred and condemned torture.' For the first time a Turkish Government was making great efforts to seek out and punish those responsible.

Relaxation of Martial Law

8. The Turkish authorities said that the gradual lifting of martial law was already under way and would be speeded up. Measures so far included establishment of Consultative Assembly; reduction of maximum period of detention without charge from 90 to 45 days; permission for former politicians (excluding leaders) to comment on new constitution; right of appeal for sentences in excess of 6 months instead of 3 years.

/Likely

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Likely Turkish Reaction if taken to the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe.

9. Mr Tindemans was told 'Turkey would be very upset' and that this move would be counter-productive particularly as regards Turkish public opinion.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS

10. Members of the Turkish Bar Association said that military intervention had been indispensable and were convinced that the military regime wanted to return to democracy.

11. Representatives of the trade unions while regretting the proceedings against the DISK Union leaders argued that the military intervention had been necessary. They confirmed that trade union activities were continuing.

12. The Chairman of the Ankara Bar Association was more critical of the military regime and said the human rights situation was extremely bad.

13. Former Prime Ministers Ecevit and Demirel both told the Belgian Ambassador that they believed the Generals would restore democracy.

CONCLUSION

14. 'One is left with the impression that it is the firm will of the Turkish Authorities to return to democracy as soon as possible.'

15. Mr Tindemans urged the Turkish Government to set more specific dates as soon as possible for the return to democracy and to improve the situation in the human rights field.

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CYPRUS

OBJECTIVE

1. To discourage Papandreou from pressing for international action, by the 10 or otherwise, which would undermine the current intercommunal talks.

POINTS TO MAKE

2. Share desire for progress but believe a solution will only be achieved by direct dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Still scope in present intercommunal talks.

3. Aware of responsibilities. We and other members of Ten should support UN efforts, not indulge in separate initiatives which might undermine them. Hope you will encourage Greek Cypriots to continue to negotiate seriously in the talks.

4. [DEFENSIVE] Of course we hope Turkish troops will withdraw. But not practical politics in advance of real progress in intercommunal talks.

BACKGROUND

1. UN tabled compromise ideas in intercommunal talks last November. Turks welcomed this (present Government in Ankara more flexible than predecessors or likely successors, but under no real pressure from Greek Cypriots in talks). Greek Cypriots equivocal. Temperature raised by Papandreou, who visited Cyprus in February, and is now trying to push West into twisting Turkish arms. Canvassing idea that Willi Brandt might use 'good offices' (UN Secretary General already charged with this function): has endorsed Russian propaganda idea of international conference. Has also written to EC Heads of Government urging Ten to press Turkey to withdraw troops (draft reply being submitted separately). With Greeks members, Turks would reject action by Ten as biased. [NOT FOR DISCLOSURE: **CONFIDENTIAL** There has been discreet coordination or support for UN with /French

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French, Germans and Italians, (who, alone of EC - apart from Greeks - have missions in Nicosia). Our views are close.]

2. Kyprianou now threatening internationalisation within weeks if no breakthrough in talks. This would probably cause collapse of talks; but Greek Cypriots anxious to avoid blame for breakdown and may be restrained from going to the brink.

3. Papandreou's letter did not mention particular action by us as guarantor power. He has told us that this is not in his mind at present. He could nonetheless mention it.

Our line is that we are already active, as the major contributor to UN Peacekeeping Force, and diplomatically in support of UN.

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EHG(B)(82)9 ADDENDUM

26 March 1982

COPY NO

71

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, BRUSSELS

29/30 MARCH 1982

POLITICAL COOPERATION

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Addendum to Annex F : CYPRUS

BACKGROUND ANNEX A : Text of Prime Minister's letter.

1. Prime Minister's reply to Papandreou's letter now sent to Athens, though Papandreou unlikely to have received it yet. Reply takes line identical to that in 'Points to Make' but, since Greeks may publish it, Turkish military withdrawal point is treated cautiously (eg. noting Papandreou's offer to withdraw (insignificant) Greek contingent and agreeing that, on question of foreign troops, just settlement must be on basis of relevant UN resolutions).

2. Among our partners, we have consulted French, Germans and Italians, who are taking similar line. They are being given copy of Prime Minister's letter and we hope to see theirs in due course.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

26 March 1982

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FM FCO 251830Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 25 MARCH

AND TO PRIORITY NICOSIA, ANKARA, PARIS, ROME, BONN, UKMIS
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING TO COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN,
THE HAGUE.

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 4 MARCH ABOUT CYPRUS.

I ENTIRELY AGREE ON THE URGENT NEED FOR A JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE RISKS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP, BOTH THROUGH OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. WE PLAYED OUR PART IN ENCOURAGING THE RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES IN NICOSIA AND HAVE CONTINUED TO GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS' EFFORTS.

IN MY VIEW THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS HAVE IN RECENT MONTHS SHOWN BETTER PROSPECTS THAN BEFORE. I UNDERSTAND THAT A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AREAS REMAIN FOR DISCUSSION WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE EVALUATION MADE BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT PREDICTIONS OF DEADLOCK COULD IN THE END PROVE SELF-FULFILLING. I BELIEVE THAT ALL CONCERNED SHOULD DO THEIR UTMOST TO HELP MAINTAIN MOMENTUM IN THE TALKS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO THIS END.

I HAVE TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF YOUR OFFER TO WITHDRAW THE GREEK MILITARY CONTINGENT. SO FAR AS THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN THE REPUBLIC IS CONCERNED, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE ALWAYS TAKEN THE VIEW THAT A JUST SETTLEMENT MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. BUT IT

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IS IMPORTANT TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THIS RESPECT IN ADVANCE OF MORE GENERAL PROGRESS TOWARDS AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT.

IT SEEMS TO ME IMPERATIVE TO AVOID ACTION WHICH MIGHT CUT ACROSS OR UNDERMINE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND THE INITIATIVE WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL. A SETTLEMENT WILL ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN CYPRIOTS. IN MY VIEW THE COUNTRIES OF THE TEN MUST CONCENTRATE ON SUSTAINING THE INTERCOMMUNAL DIALOGUE, WHICH CONSTITUTES THE ONLY EFFECTIVE AVENUE TOWARDS A SOLUTION. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN THIS.

CARRINGTON

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN
CYPRUS

COPIES SENT TO
No. 11 DOWNING STREET

CSCE

OBJECTIVE

1. Secure agreement to Presidency draft on press guidelines concerning Ten's attitude to adjournment.

POINTS TO MAKE

Success in Recent Session

2. Believe have been successful at Madrid both in focussing latest session on Poland and in moving meeting towards long adjournment, which is best way of preserving CSCE process and maintaining neutral and non-aligned (NNA) document as basis of negotiation.

Press Guidelines

3. Important to explain publicly Ten's position on adjournment. Support Presidency draft incorporating views expressed in Political Committee.

[If necessary]

4. Press guidelines should not link prospects for resumption too closely to events in Poland.

BACKGROUND

Course of Recent Session

1. Devoted almost entirely to Soviet and Polish violations of the Final Act. Many neutral as well as Western delegations took a robust line. East attempted unsuccessfully to resume negotiations. West held together remarkably well and forced meeting to accept that business could not be conducted as usual. West also succeeded in moving meeting towards adjournment.

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Some partners, FRG, Denmark and Greece, showed some readiness to negotiate on substance during recent session and FRG accepted need for adjournment somewhat reluctantly. But these differences were contained within Western camp.

Press Guidelines

3. Discussion at the Political Committee (26 March)

... resulted in the Presidency draft attached. We fully support it.

4. In our own unattributable briefing of the press we have stressed our continuing commitment to the Final Act; indicated that much would depend upon events, not least but not exclusively in Poland; and emphasised we were setting no preconditions concerning work in November but that clearly our attitude would need to be decided in the light of the situation prevailing at that time.

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DRAFT STATEMENT AGREED BY POLITICAL COMMITTEE 26 MARCH

1. The Ten regret that violations of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, of which the repression in Poland constitutes the most serious aspect, prevented a positive outcome in Madrid and put at risk the CSCE process as a whole.
2. In this context, the Ten note that the adjournment of the Madrid meeting, which came about at the initiative of the neutral and non-aligned countries, was necessary to preserve the CSCE process.
3. The Ten remain deeply attached to the progress which can be made in the field of the CSCE.
4. The Ten expressed the hope that at the reopening of the Madrid meeting in November the circumstances prevailing will be more propitious for a positive outcome of that meeting by the adoption of a substantial and balanced concluding document.

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ANNEX H: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

POINT TO MAKE

1. British resources already fully committed to Hong Kong, to rescues by British shipping, and to family reunions.

BACKGROUND

Ref: European Parliament Resolution on Cap Anamur

CAP ANAMUR

2. The 'Cap Anamur' is a hospital/rescue ship operated since late 1979 by FRG charities and supported by (but not dependent on) Commission funds. Until October 1981 all the over 9,000 refugees rescued were settled in West Germany, but at that point the authorities in the Lander, who are responsible for immigration, refused to accept more. Since then the Federal Government has sought the agreement of the other EC member states to share the load.

[NOT FOR USE] Herr Genscher did not raise the question bilaterally at the Anglo-German Summit.

EC SETTLEMENT OF BOAT PEOPLE

3. Since 1975 the UK has received some 15,000 boat people, including 10,000 from Hong Kong in the quota announced in July 1979 and now exhausted. Comparable figures for other EC countries are:

France	11,000	(out of a total of nearly 80,000 S E Asian refugees)
FRG	15,500	
Netherlands	5,000	
Belgium	1,300	
Denmark	2,100	
Italy	2,100	
Ireland	230	
Luxembourg	90	
Greece	120	

FUTURE PROGRAMMES

4. Among EC members, only France has a significant continuing S E Asian refugee programme (1,000 a month) but this does not include many boat people. In addition, Netherlands and UK in particular continue to accept significant numbers of refugees rescued by their merchant ships (nearly 3,000 by UK since 1975). The UK has accepted over 2,000 family reunion applications from relatives still in Vietnam of refugees now living in the United Kingdom.

HONG KONG

5. There are currently 10,000 boat people in Hong Kong, and resettlement offers, primarily from USA and Australia are drying up rapidly. There will almost certainly be a sharp rise in the number of refugees in Hong Kong during the summer.

[NOT FOR USE] This may lead to renewed pressure on HMG for a further quota late this year.

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The European Parliament,

- noting that the European Community has hitherto provided financial support for the rescue ship 'Cap Anamur',
- aware that the main problem is finding a home for the refugees in the countries of the European Community:
 1. Calls on the participants in EPC not only to discuss this problem but to come to a decision at its meeting of 22 March 1982;
 2. Hopes that this decision will be translated into action by the governments of the peoples of Europe and the EEC Commission, so that this special private humanitarian institution can continue to carry out its work helping to save refugees in the China Sea.

PE 77.396 /rev.

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